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Few would disagree that fake news, the most visible part of the war of 
disinformation, represents a real and present threat for our societies. 
On one hand, the debate on disinformation encompasses a spectrum 
of information types. From low-risk forms of click-bait to intentional 
attempts to corrode trust in our democracies, the latter sometimes 
by means of techniques that are extremely sophisticated and based 
on well-orchestrated plans by foreign states and local groups.  On the 
other, accusations of fake news are frequently hurled indiscriminately 
and have themselves become a tool of delegitimisation, as different 
sides attempt to impose their own narrative. And, paradoxically, the 
more fake news is discussed, the greater societal problem it is felt to 
be. This undermines trust in all media and instils the idea that it is 
impossible to know what is true and what is not.  It is this distrust that 
is especially detrimental to the fundamental role of media as a pillar 
in our democratic societies. 
These challenges need to be taken on board and addressed ahead of 
the upcoming European Parliament elections. If we believe that an 
informed citizen underpins democracy, then these issues require 
action. But what action exactly?
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Overview
This High-Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD), organised by 
the School of Transnational Governance of the Euro-
pean University Institute on 11 February 2019, brought 
together high level policy experts from the (social) media-
sector,  leading academics and journalists to debate the 
topic of ‘Online disinformation ahead of the European 
Parliament elections: towards societal resilience’.  
The model of the School of Transnational Governance’s 
HLPDs is that of an open discussion among participants 
under Chatham House Rule. During the discussion, the 
participants recognised the important societal challenges 
posed by disinformation ahead of the European Parlia-
ment elections, as well as the dangers posed by societal 
distrust of the media as a fundamental pillar in our dem-
ocratic societies and the risks of entrusting private enti-
ties and public institutions with the decision as to what is 
true or false. 
Starting from the importance of social media platforms 
taking all possible action as established in the recent 
European Code of Practice, the fundamental rights per-
spective provided the focus of the HLPD. The discussion 
of the Dialogue therefore centred around strengthening 
sustainable societal resilience by tools and methods like 
fact-checking, media and information literacy, media 
pluralism and the contribution of academic institutes as 
independent agents well positioned to foster balanced 
multi-dimensional approaches
Starting from the action and progress made on the issue 
of disinformation within the EU over the last year, this 
Policy Brief highlights some of the main challenges 
towards building societal resilience against disinforma-
tion in Europe. 
In particular, the policy brief identifies three areas 
emerging from the discussions during the HLPD in 
which further action is urgently needed. 
1. Given the importance of both effective and sustainable responses to disinformation, well-
coordinated academic research throughout Europe is essential. First of all platforms 
need to take further action by providing privacy-compliant access to data for the study of 
disinformation dynamics by academics. From the side of academics in particular, further 
action needs to be taken on the development of the European Centres for interdisciplinary 
and independent evidence-based research on problems of disinformation, as well as on the 
coordination of such research. The independent academic output and findings should serve as 
input to well-coordinated training programs for both public and private policymakers.
2. While media pluralism remains one of the strongest weapons against disinformation as it cre-
ates societal resilience and dilutes disinformation with fact checked information, pluralism is 
under threat and more action is required to protect it. To this end European wide monitoring of 
pluralism is essential, as well as further steps to create a future proof (regulatory) level playing 
field and the development of new business models in the sector, including attractive alternative 
algorithms to the filter bubble and impartial delivery by platforms.
3. Equally important for sustainable societal resilience is the strenghting strengthening of Media 
and Information Literacy (MIL). This requires a cross-cutting approach and greater investment 
and coordination furthering digital skills, diverse news consumption and critical thinking whilst 
avoiding a general feeling of distrust. The new Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) 
provides a golden opportunity to advance MIL also by giving regulatory authorities a coordina-
tion role.
Action Points
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I. Background: Advice and policy
Few would disagree that fake news, the most visible part 
of the war of disinformation, represents a real and present 
threat for our societies.  The debate on disinformation 
encompasses a spectrum of information types. From low-
risk forms of click-bait to intentional attempts to corrode 
trust in our democracies, the latter sometimes by means 
of techniques that are extremely sophisticated and based 
on well-orchestrated plans by foreign states and local 
groups. Information warfare requires capabilities that are 
both adequate and proportionate.  
Luckily the evidence we have so far, from research car-
ried out by the Oxford Reuters group1, is that the direct 
impact of disinformation on political decision making is 
not alarming with its effects largely limited to groups of 
“believers” seeking to reinforce their own opinions and 
prejudices. One needs to also take into account that accu-
sations of fake news are frequently hurled indiscriminately 
and have themselves become a tool of delegitimisation, 
as different sides attempt to impose their own narrative. 
And, paradoxically, the more fake news is discussed, the 
greater societal problem it is felt to be. This undermines 
trust in all media and instils the idea that it is impossible 
to know what is true and what is not.  
It is this distrust that is especially detrimental to the fun-
damental role of media as a pillar in our democratic soci-
eties. Distrust muzzles media in their role as watchdog 
thereby severely challenging their ability to provide effec-
tive checks and balances. The societal distrust is furthered 
by so-called “deep fakes”, a development made possible 
by artificial intelligence whereby audio-visual content is 
manipulated in such a way as to make it impossible to 
recognise true from false.
These challenges need to be taken on board and addressed 
ahead of the upcoming European Parliament elections. If 
we believe that an informed citizen underpins democracy, 
then these issues require action. But what action exactly? 
Report EC High Level Expert group
Within Europe several initiatives have been taken. In 
January 2018, the European Commission set up an inde-
pendent high-level group of experts (“the HLEG”) to 
advise on policy initiatives to counter fake news and dis-
information spread online. The HLEG delivered a report 
designed to review best practices in the light of funda-
mental principles, and suitable responses stemming from 
such principles. 
Disinformation as defined in this Report includes all 
forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information 
designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause 
public harm or for profit. It does not cover issues arising 
from the creation and dissemination online of illegal 
content (notably defamation, hate speech, incitement to 
violence), which are subject to regulatory remedies under 
EU or national laws, nor other forms of deliberate but not 
misleading distortions of facts such a satire and parody.
This definition was uptaken in all the initiatives the Com-
missions took on the topic since then, as well as in the 
multi-dimensional approach taken by the HLEG. The 
HLEG advises the Commission against simplistic solu-
tions. The multi-dimensional approach recommended 
by the HLEG in March is based on five interconnected 
responses. These responses rest on five pillars designed 
to:
1. Enhance transparency of online news, involving 
an adequate and privacy-compliant sharing of data 
about the systems that enable their circulation online;
2. Promote media and information literacy to counter 
disinformation and help users navigate the digital 
media environment;
3. Develop tools for empowering users and journalists 
to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engage-
ment with fast-evolving information technologies;
4. Safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the Euro-
pean news media ecosystem, and
5. Promote continued research on the impact of disin-
formation in Europe to evaluate the measures taken 
by different actors and constantly adjust the neces-
sary responses.
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Communication and Code of Practice
Following the HLEG report, the Commission published 
in April its Communication on measures to tackle disin-
formation online, including an EU-wide Code of Prac-
tice on Disinformation, support for an independent net-
work of fact-checkers, and a series of actions to stimulate 
quality journalism and promote media literacy. Based 
on the 10 key principles that were developed and agreed 
upon by the HLEG, a Multi-stakeholder Forum devel-
oped a Code of Practice in September. 
The Forum includes representatives of online platforms 
as well as the advertising industry and advertisers. This 
was the first time worldwide that industry agreed, on a 
voluntary basis, to self-regulatory standards on disin-
formation. The first results were published in January 
2019. The reports show that online platforms and adver-
tisement industries have indeed taken action, but fur-
ther efforts must be deployed to improve the reliability 
of the online ecosystem. Not all actions are taken up in 
all member states, and most notably, the platforms have 
not put enough effort into supporting (independent) 
research, and providing privacy-compliant access to data 
for the study of disinformation dynamics by academics. 
In its monitoring during the coming months ahead of the 
elections the Commission will pay special attention to 
the reporting on the implementation of policies and tools 
that relate to the integrity of electoral processes.
Action Plan Elections
On 5 December 2018, the European Commission and the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy presented the ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ 
setting out concrete measures to tackle disinformation 
in Europe and beyond (western Balkans and eastern and 
southern neighbours of EU). 
This Action Plan very explicitly refers to Hybrid Threats 
and disinformation coming from foreign States such as 
the Russian federation that may influence public opinion 
and introduces a Rapid Alert System to provide real-time 
alerts on disinformation campaigns. Member States are 
to set up a contact point in their strategic communica-
tion departments exchanging information and cooper-
ating with national and EU election networks. Online 
platforms should provide input and work with the Rapid 
Alert System. Fact based and effective communication 
from EU institutions as well as member states should be 
used to counter and deter the disinformation by coun-
tering myths. According to the Action Plan online plat-
forms should: 
• Check the identity of political advertisers 
• Close down fake accounts 
• Identify bots and label them accordingly.
II. Backdrop: High Level Policy Dialogue 
It is fundamental to note that all of the content that is 
referred to as disinformation is not illegal. Entrusting 
private entities and public institutions with the decision 
as to what is true or false while playing the role of cen-
sors entails serious risks for fundamental rights, with the 
serious risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
Consequently, the HLPD on Disinformation ahead of 
the European Parliament elections started from a funda-
mental rights perspective and focused on the strength-
ening of societal resilience by tools and methods like 
fact-checking, media- and information literacy, media 
pluralism and the contribution of academic institutes 
as independent agents well positioned to foster balanced 
multi-dimensional approaches.2 
Session I: The Fundamental Rights perspective
Globally we witness increasing calls for certain sources 
and websites to be blacklisted, blocked or demoted in 
searches. Global platforms are not only pressured to 
filter disinformation but also to make available the pri-
vate data of those who have allegedly published fake news 
or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings taking 
place in distant jurisdictions where they have no effective 
way to defend themselves. In this context, various forms 
of private and public censorship are increasingly likely to 
occur.
At the core of democracy there lies a paradox. It both 
depends on and is itself a search for truth that can only 
be attained by the contrasting and discussion of different 
viewpoints. The need for states to address potentially 
detrimental forms of disinformation that are sometimes 
state-driven and attempt to corrode trust in democracies 
requires attention.
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The first session set out to discuss these issues and address 
a series of related questions, including: What responses 
will avoid the risks posed by private and public censor-
ship while being simultaneously effective? How can cen-
sorship of legitimate speech be avoided in line with inter-
national human rights standards? Fact-checking has an 
important role to play, provided it is independent and free 
from any political influence. How and by whom should 
fact-checking be organised and carried out? Is there a 
fundamental right to correct fact-checked information?
While some argued for the right to reliable knowledge 
or the right to be informed in a verifiable way could be 
envisaged within the right to information, overall, there 
was broad consensus that a fundamental right to correct 
fact-checked information does not exist, and could even 
endanger democracy. However, the right to receive infor-
mation in the public sphere and the democratic search 
for truth by citizens was considered central to democ-
racy. Further, while the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) protects opinions as well as facts, greater 
attention to which areas are more ‘dangerous’ and require 
limitations of Article 10 and where it is most important 
to have accurate and reliable information may be needed. 
While evidence based ‘truth’ may be expected in certain 
areas such as health, in the realm of politics open debates 
must always be facilitated. However, this must contend 
with the fact that our political discussion is increasingly 
being blurred by information that is untrustworthy.
With regard to the question of who should decide what is 
true and false, there was consensus that it should not be 
public or private actors – neither governments nor plat-
forms – but well-informed citizens with a special respon-
sibility held by independent fact checkers and journalists 
that need to be placed in a position to actually be able to 
do their fact checking and editorial work. 
In this context, the role of media and the responsibility 
of journalists were discussed. On one hand the problems 
in defining who is a journalist today was raised, as media 
freedom also entails specific duties for journalists, as 
opposed to individuals. On the other, the responsibility 
of large media organisations was also debated, also with 
regard to their responsibility in shaping citizens’ views 
over time.  Further, the role of courts and the question 
of jurisdiction were debated, also in light of problems of 
representation and trials in absentia. In this context, the 
question of how to treat digital platforms and their rela-
tionship with users was raised, also in relation to whether 
courts should exercise some degree of deference to the 
institutional mechanisms of digital platforms. Further, 
while platforms should never act as arbiters of truth, they 
should always act responsibly when promoting sponsored 
content and deciding whether to accept transactions.
Finally, some participants expressed their preoccupa-
tion that certain mechanisms contained in the Action 
plan could be detrimental to freedom of information as 
enshrined in the Charter and the ECHR, including East 
Stratcom and the Rapid Alert System, but only in so far as 
to the content is concerned, as opposed to fake accounts.
The session concluded that from a fundamental rights 
perspective while there may not be a silver bullet answer 
to counter disinformation online, we must take care that 
the antidote is not worse than the problem it is trying to 
solve. In this context the best answer may lie in creating 
societal resilience against disinformation ahead of the 
European Parliament elections.  
▶ Strengthening societal 
resilience is the only 
truly future-proof  way to 
counter disinformation while 
maintaining fundamental 
rights, including through 
fact-checking, media- and 
information literacy for young 
and old, media pluralism and 
the contribution of academic 
institutes as independent 
agents well positioned to 
foster balanced multi-
dimensional and sustainable 
approaches. 
Session II: Media and information literacy
Given today’s information overload, MIL is a crucial 
component of critical thinking as it can enable reasoned 
participation in the on-line public sphere. MIL can also 
TAKE 
AWAY
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help to contribute to a more trustworthy digital infor-
mation ecosystem: a critical readership will provide an 
incentive to media companies to continuously improve 
their products and services. From a European perspec-
tive, education is considered an area of “supporting com-
petence” for which the EU can support, coordinate and 
supplement Member State action. At the same time, the 
revised AVMSD introduces new media literacy obliga-
tions for Member States and videosharing platforms. 
The second session of the HLPD discussed these issues 
and sought to answer the following questions: what 
actions are currently being applied and can be taken in 
this field? What overarching solutions should be put in 
place and how? With regard to defining ‘media literacy’, 
it is essential to have a multidimensional understanding 
of the concept beyond a focus on functional skills, which 
should be citizen (recipient)-centred, multidisciplinary 
and focusing on critical understanding and the ability to 
recognise the difference between opinion and fact. The 
current digital environment is illegible for the majority 
of the population and MIL has a key role to play in this 
respect, building on many years of experience in the field. 
However, it must also be recognised that MIL is not a 
silver bullet – it is important to reach an understanding 
of what MIL can solve and where other responses may be 
necessary. Further, the need to focus on long term as well 
as short term solutions was emphasised as no simplistic 
solution will work in the field and behaviour change pro-
grams also form a key part of MIL. 
MIL must always be seen within the broader context 
in which we witness a decrease and erosion of trust in 
sources of authoritativeness, but also in institutions. 
Unless these problems are also addressed MIL efforts will 
prove ineffective. In fact, the creation of ‘knowledge’, as 
opposed to information, presupposes trust and authority. 
Transparency was highlighted as a key ingredient to 
increasing trust and credibility, especially with regard 
to the processes used by platforms. In this context it is 
essential that platforms disclose as much information as 
possible and help people understand ‘why they are seeing 
what they are seeing’.  
While the public, people and users are extraordinarily 
diverse, blanket MIL policies risk increasing inequality 
and marginalisation unless they are carried out paying 
attention to the relevant audience, including the way 
young people form their opinions today. It is also essential 
to go beyond established media, create ‘ambassadors’ and 
find easy messages, although this should never amount 
to ‘dumbing down’ media literacy. On one hand there 
is no one size fits all approach to MIL as needs are very 
diverse, on the other there is a general lack of evaluation 
of existing initiatives. The question of how to measure the 
impact of MIL initiatives was also raised in this context. 
Taking stock of what has been done with regard to MIL 
todate, many ‘missed opportunities’ in MIL had to be 
regretted. Although the notion of MIL has been discussed 
for decades, its action implementation remains the main 
problem, as well as the need for coordination. While 
there are large numbers of MIL projects across Europe, 
lack of coordination both at the European and at the local 
level remains a problem. 
The need for a cross - cutting approach, as well as the need 
for integration especially in the education sector, but also 
in other government policy areas, were considered essen-
tial in this respect. On one hand, the media sector and 
the education sector need to work together on MIL, also 
in the context of the huge opportunities offered by edu-
cational technology. On the other, further attention also 
needs to be devoted to reaching those who are not in edu-
cation, and identifying which policy actors may be cen-
tral to these efforts, whether for instance public service 
media, libraries or commercial actors. 
Other key challenges were seen to lie not only in the lin-
guistic diversity in Europe, but also in the question of 
shared competences between the EU and member states. 
The new AVMSD which includes an obligation on states 
to report presents a key opportunity in this respect, in 
which media regulators could also play a role. In partic-
ular article 33a calls on Member States to promote and 
take measures for the development of media literacy 
skills, while article 28b imposes on states the obligation 
to ensure VSP ‘effective media literacy measures and tools 
and raising users’ awareness of using those measures and 
tools’. Finally, article 30b also provides a role for Euro-
pean Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 
(ERGA) to exchange experience and best practices on 
MIL. 
A number of examples of MIL initiatives were discussed 
in this respect including: 
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▶ MIL efforts require a 
cross-cutting approach and 
greater investment and 
coordination furthering 
digital skills, diverse 
news consumption and 
criticialcritical thinking 
whilst avoiding a general 
feeling of distrust. 
▶ The new AVMSD provides 
a golden opportunity to 
advance MIL also by giving 




• ‘Klicksafe’ in Germany sponsored by the EU3 - It was 
seen as successful example as it used simple language, 
had a budget for marketing and involved ‘you-tubers’ 
as influencers targeting youths.
• ‘Media scout’ which covered 800 schools in Northern 
region of Germany, was seen as an example of using 
appropriate language and creating ambassadors.4
• ‘Be Media Smart’ by Media Literacy Ireland, which 
was aimed at general public, and received huge sup-
port from a number of actors, including PSM, broad-
casters and platforms.5
• Facebook ten tips to check fake news.6  Caution was 
expressed by participants with regard to this type of 
initiative as the risk of backfire and creating com-
plete cynicism towards news must be avoided at all 
costs, given the key role of good functioning media 
to counter disinformation. 
More generally it was emphasised that MIL, both for the 
young and old, plays an important role in strengthening 
societal resilience against disinformation. However, MIL 
campaigns on disinformation too may face the risk of 
‘throwing away the baby with the bathwater’.  
The more the dangers of fake news are outlined and warn-
ings are signalled, the greater societal problem it is felt to 
be. This undermines the general trust in all media and 
instils the idea that it is impossible to know what is true 
and what is not. It is this distrust that is especially detri-
mental to the fundamental role of media as a pillar under 
our democratic societies. When audiences do not know 
what to believe anymore the media as a watchdog is muz-
zled.  
Therefore, all MIL efforts should be designed by true MIL 
professionals in the field that use the utmost care. Cre-
ating a general atmosphere of distrust should be avoided 
at all costs. A positive stance is the preferred way forward 
to further societal resilience, for instance by focusing 
on the importance of breaking out of the filter bubble. 
Well-balanced information on the importance of diverse 
consumption of news truly empowers consumers towards 
well-informed opinions, whilst avoiding the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of distrust.
Session III: Challenges for Media Pluralism
Independent and pluralistic media are crucial compo-
nents of a democratic society. Diluting disinformation 
through enhanced visibility of a wide variety of trusted 
news can therefore only achieve its goals if combined with 
actions designed to preserve diversity and the long-term 
economic sustainability of the news media eco system. 
How can sustainability be ensured given that news media 
is currently undergoing a transformation from the tra-
ditional off-line environment to the online distribution 
model? How does one define quality journalism? What 
measures are needed to ensure that certain forms of jour-
nalism remain financially viable? Should states and public 
bodies play a key role in this dynamic?
Media diversity is a key factor in building societal resil-
ience against the impact of disinformation. Today there 
is an urgent need to maintain plurality in the media, 
both from the media perspective and from the consumer 
perspective; the more diverse news is consumed the less 
likely it is that disinformation is believed to be truth by 
creating natural checks. 
Digitalisation continues to disrupt traditional media. Data 
reveals a continuous migration of advertising towards the 
digital environment: since 2016, internet advertising rev-
enues, mostly driven by mobile phones, have surpassed 
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broadcasting TV revenues. In digital advertising Google 
and Facebook get the lion’s share: in 2017 they accounted 
for more than 60% of global online ad revenues, while the 
share is even higher in European countries. The other eco-
nomic threat to media plurality includes the separating 
of information distribution from the physical originating 
media thereby reducing the second source of revenue of 
traditional media: sales to readers and viewers. 
At the same time technology has created significant chal-
lenges for the quality of information, including the disap-
pearance of many traditional and local media as a source 
of qualified opinion, the absence of editorial control and 
editorial responsibility in the distribution model of infor-
mation typical of major internet players, and the polar-
isation of opinions in filter bubbles and echo chambers. 
While traditional media face increasing economic prob-
lems, disinformation requires enormous effort for tradi-
tional media, as fact-checking requires time and money.
In this context, there is an urgent need to create better 
level playing field and come up with competitive business 
models, also with respect to data and advertising. While 
consumption of the media has increased, the entire 
audio-visual sector is changing dramatically and tradi-
tional media have not found alternative business models. 
Traditional media therefore need to work on improving 
their business models, while exploiting the role of data 
and the new market for data. The question of public 
interventions and public financing was discussed as well 
as the risk of loss of independence. If a well-functioning 
media system is considered a public good, we need to find 
ways to counteract the disruption of traditional media. A 
number of good practices or proposals were put forward 
in this respect, including training for journalists, support 
for innovation, MIL, facilitating tools for fact-checking, 
as well as the idea of a ‘citizens’ credit’. 
At all times, however, it is essential to avoid mixing of 
sponsored and editorial content, while hidden agendas 
are increasingly difficult to spot with the rise of content 
marketing. Supporting start-ups, crowd sources, sub-
scription fees and tax incentives were also put forward 
as possible good practices. Examples of private interven-
tion, included the Facebook Journalism Project (similar 
to the Google news initiative),7  which aims to train jour-
nalists to better target audiences and identify how to use 
social media to become more innovative, and develop 
successful business models based also on data analytics. 
Caution about the risks of a race to the bottom to not cor-
rect the titles of news items was expressed in this context, 
as well as the need to ensure independence. 
At the same time market concentration must be moni-
tored closely and Member States, EU Institutions, regula-
tors must be diligent in regulating markets. With respect 
to media concentration, we are experiencing substan-
tial concentration movements. In this context regula-
tory authorities have a key role to play, including in the 
implementation of the AVMSD and video sharing plat-
form regulations. The question of whether it is still mean-
ingful to measure pluralism was discussed, and while the 
answer was always positive, there was also agreement that 
we need to improve the way we measure the concentra-
tion of media markets, also by including a consumer per-
spective, in which reach is equally important as offer of 
media content. 
Session IV: The role of academia
The evolving nature of disinformation requires a sub-
stantial strengthening of detection and analytical capa-
bilities. While independent fact-checking is important to 
identify individual cases of disinformation, continuous, 
multi-disciplinary research is necessary to foster a better 
▶ While media pluralism 
remains one of the 
strongest weapons against 
disinformation as it creates 
societal resilience and 
dilutes disinformation with 
fact checked information, 
pluralism is under threat 
and more action is required 
to protect it. 
▶ To this end European wide 
monitoring of pluralism 
is essential, as well as 
further steps to create a 
(regulatory) level playing 
field and the development 
of new business models 
in the sector, including 
attractive alternative 
algorithms to the filter 
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understanding of the actors, the reasons behind, the 
techniques and methods used to maximise the impact of 
increasingly sophisticated disinformation strategies. An 
in-depth knowledge of local information environments 
is important to prioritise research efforts around topics 
with high impact on national audiences. At the same 
time, effective coordination among researchers in dif-
ferent Member States is essential in view of the transna-
tional nature of the phenomenon.  
Against this backdrop, the last session aimed to answer 
the following questions: What type of independent 
research should be promoted in order to ensure robust 
and evidence-based policy responses? What should be 
the role of public authorities in supporting such endeav-
ours? How could national research teams best coordinate 
their efforts at EU level?
The current information disorder is part of wider set of 
socio-political changes. Communication technologies 
have created an abundance of information, including 
false information, which may in turn have insulated some 
citizens from trustworthy sources. Wider participation in 
and diversity of the public sphere is accompanied by polit-
ical contestation of traditionally authoritative sources. 
While academic understanding of these phenomena is 
evolving, in the short term a substantial strengthening of 
detection and analytical capabilities directed specifically 
at disinformation is needed. 
It has been noted that a large part of the current disin-
formation discussion and research focuses on US reali-
ties and may not easily translate to European contexts, 
particularly across different political systems, media 
ecosystems and diverse languages.  The challenges posed 
by these diverse contexts are highlighted by platforms’ 
partial failure to implement measures under the Code of 
Practice against Disinformation in all EU Member States. 
While in-depth knowledge of local information environ-
ments is important to prioritise research efforts around 
topics with high impact on national audiences, research 
needs to be coordinated around a common definition 
of the disinformation problem and must aim towards 
common policy prescriptions at the European level and 
across Member States.
Various academic disciplines engage with different aspects 
of information disorder, from the cybersecurity aspects 
of disinformation or the impact of information design on 
user assessments of content credibility, to architectural 
questions such as the role algorithms in news diffusion 
and consumption; finally, there are important legal ques-
tions such as whether private digital platforms are part of 
the public sphere. 
On a practical level, there are significant efforts on devel-
oping fact-checking methods and assistive technologies. 
Participants highlighted good practices of multi-disci-
plinary collaboration including new research projects 
and teaching programs, sometimes set up in partnership 
with private companies. As academic disciplines define 
their own problems and do not naturally speak the same 
conceptual language, a coordinated effort is needed to 
integrate insights from across disciplines and focus on 
delivering coherent policy recommendations. While the 
implementation of the MIL mandate under the AVMSD 
has seen some media regulators emerge as catalysts for 
multi-disciplinary collaborations, an EU wide very sys-
tematic mobilisation of resources and expertise is needed, 
for instance by establishing the network of research cen-
tres on disinformation called for by the HLEG. 
The platforms’ crucial rule in facilitating research was 
acknowledged, due to the wealth of relevant data that 
they hold. Two specific examples of access to platform 
data were discussed in detail: 
• The Social Science One8  partnership with Facebook 
to facilitate research on democracy & elections. While 
the initiative was commended, participants stressed 
that European researchers had not yet obtained 
access to the data, nor had they received responses 
to their inquiries. Furthermore, it was felt that the 
focus on elections was too narrow compared to the 
challenges posed by information disorder and that a 
broader investigation of media consumption patterns 
was necessary.
• Transparency of political ads,9 which was one of the 
specific commitments included in the Code of Prac-
tice. This measure had not yet been implemented in 
the EU (with the exception of the UK). It was hoped 
that upgrades envisaged for the European roll-out 
would address current limitations which hinder 
effective research, for instance in the database search 
function.
Platforms also hold a wealth of other data not currently 
subject to either transparency or research access mea-
sures. For instance, there is no access scheme for data on 
organic news diffusion, which is relevant for evaluating 
10 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2019/03 | April 2019
the share of mis / disinformation in the citizens’ actual 
news diet, as well as identifying those particularly vul-
nerable to being insulated from trustworthy content. 
Recent experiments in providing platforms’ users with 
fact-checked content have also generated vast amounts 
of data, currently unavailable for research. Similarly, 
when pages and accounts are removed for coordinated 
inauthentic behaviour, richer data on the behaviour and 
methods of these malicious actors could be made avail-
able for research. At the same, data scraping, even when 
specifically conducted for academic purposes, remains 
prohibited by most platforms’ policies and is sometimes 
thwarted by technical means, thus hindering indepen-
dent research.
The overarching question was raised of how to structure 
the data held by platforms for research access purposes. 
Furthermore, significant and legitimate challenges in 
providing access to data were noted, in particular with 
regard to the depersonalization of user data and the risk 
that malicious actors reverse engineer and learn how to 
exploit the platforms’ technical responses to disinfor-
mation. However, these challenges could be addressed 
by proper coordination and drawing more broadly on 
existing academic expertise at an early stage.
There was broad agreement that research was essential in 
order to:
• Systematically identify disinformation topics and 
trends, beyond the anecdotical examples found by 
fact-checking;
• Characterise the technical means (bots, deceptive 
pages, sponsored content) and dissemination vectors 
(e.g. influencers, online messaging groups);
• Achieve a citizen-centric behavioural diagnosis, i.e. 
who is reached by disinformation, who is insulated 
from trustworthy content, what is the actual persua-
sive impact of disinformation;
• Assess the effectiveness of interventions on platforms 
and other initiatives, such as media literacy and fact 
checking efforts, but also for the adaptation of media 
& public communication responses.
Such research would need to be very well coordinated to 
reach common definitions of the problem, achieve effec-
tive cooperation with platforms, who hold crucial data, 
and produce coherent policy recommendations. The 
independent academic output and findings should serve 
as input to well-coordinated training programs for both 
public and private policymakers in the field of disinfor-
mation to realise its potential.
▶ Given the importance of both 
effective and sustainable 
responses to disinformation 
well-coordinated academic 
research throughout Europe is 
essential. 
▶ In particular, further 
action needs to be taken 
on the development of 
the European Centres for 
interdisciplinary and 
independent evidence-based 
research on problems of 
disinformation, as well as 
on the coordination of such 
research as advised by the 
HLEG. 
▶ Also platforms need to take 
further action in this context 
by providing privacy-compliant 
access to data for the study 
of disinformation dynamics by 
academics. 
▶ The independent academic 
output and findings should 
serve as input to well-
coordinated training programs 
for both public and private 
policymakers.
III. Conclusion
Huge progress has been made on these issues within the 
EU over the last year. After the HLEG has published its 
report in March 2018, the European Commission came 
in April with its Communication with policy initiatives 
largely based on this report.  In December 2018, the 
European Commission and the EU High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented the 
‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ setting out measures 
to tackle disinformation in Europe and beyond. In Jan-
uary 2019 the European Commission published the first 
reports submitted by signatories of the Code of Practice 
against disinformation of October 2018. While the Com-
mission welcomed the progress made, it also calls on sig-
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natories to intensify their efforts in the run up to the 2019 
EU elections. 
Further, while most of the report by the HLEG has been 
followed up on, some elements are not up to full speed 
yet. In particular, further action needs to be taken on 
the development of the European Centres for interdis-
ciplinary and independent evidence-based research on 
problems of disinformation, as well as on the coordina-
tion of such research. Also platforms need to take action 
in this context by providing privacy-compliant access to 
data for the study of disinformation dynamics by aca-
demics.10  
Further action is also required in the sphere of media plu-
ralism as well as with regard to media and information 
literacy. While media pluralism remains one of the stron-
gest weapons against disinformation as it creates societal 
resilience and dilutes disinformation with fact checked 
information, in many EU countries pluralism is under 
threat, and more action is required to protect it. 
1. Strengthening societal resilience is the only truly future-proof  way to counter disinformation 
while maintaining fundamental rights, including through fact-checking, media- and infor-
mation literacy for young and old, media pluralism and the contribution of academic institutes 
as independent agents well positioned to foster balanced multi-dimensional and sustainable 
approaches.
2. MIL efforts require a cross-cutting approach and greater investment and coordination fur-
thering digital skills, diverse news consumption and criticialcritical thinking whilst avoiding 
a general feeling of distrust . The new AVMSD provides a golden opportunity to advance MIL 
also by giving regulatory authorities a coordination role.
3. While media pluralism remains one of the strongest weapons against disinformation as it cre-
ates societal resilience and dilutes disinformation with fact checked information, pluralism is 
under threat and more action is required to protect it. To this end European wide monitoring of 
pluralism is essential, as well as further steps to create a (regulatory) level playing field and the 
development of new business models in the sector, including attractive alternative algorithms 
to the filter bubble and impartial delivery by platforms.
4. Given the importance of both effective and sustainable responses to disinformation well-coor-
dinated academic research throughout Europe is essential. In particular, further action needs 
to be taken on the development of the European Centres for interdisciplinary and independent 
evidence-based research on problems of disinformation, as well as on the coordination of such 
research as advised by the HLEG. Also platforms need to take further action in this context 
by providing privacy-compliant access to data for the study of disinformation dynamics by 
academics. The independent academic output and findings should serve as input to well-coor-
dinated training programs for both public and private policymakers.
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